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Abstract 
In Mexico, as in most Latin American countries with indigenous populations, it is commonly 
believed that European phenotypes are preferred to mestizo or indigenous phenotypes. 
However, it is hard to test for such racial biases in the labor market using official statistics 
since race can only be inferred from native language. Moreover, employers may think that 
married females have lower productivity, and hence they may be more reluctant to hire them. 
We are interested in testing both hypotheses through a field experiment in the labor market. 
The experiment consisted on sending fictitious curriculums (CVs) responding to job 
advertisements with randomized information of the applicants. The CVs included 
photographs representing three distinct phenotypes: Caucasian, mestizo and indigenous. We 
also randomly vary marital status across gender and phenotype. Hence, our test consists on 
finding whether there are significant differences in the callback rates. We find that females 
have 40 percent more callbacks than males. We also find that indigenous looking females are 
discriminated against, but the effect is not present for males. Interestingly, married females 
are penalized in the labor market and this penalty is higher for indigenous-looking women. 
We did not find an effect of marital status on males. 
Keywords: Discrimination; Gender; Race; Labor market; Mexico; Hiring; 
Correspondence study.  
JEL: I24; J10; J16; J70; O54. 
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Recent literature in economics has made an increasing effort to provide credible 
measures of discrimination by race, age, gender and physical appearance.1 Those 
studies have relied on the use of correspondence studies to measure discrimination 
at the point of hire. From our reading of the literature we have not found studies on 
racial discrimination in countries where race is not as physically salient as those 
countries with varied racial mixes derived from historical immigration influxes.2 
Mexico is a country in which racial features are not as pronounced, but there is 
however a range of darkness in the population going from Caucasian phenotypes to 
darker indigenous phenotypes and all the phenotypes within. Distinguishing 
discrimination in such a context is harder because the use of names does not 
directly imply a racial origin.  
In this paper we aim at identifying racial discrimination in Mexico along the range of 
phenotypes generated by the miscegenation during the Spanish colony. We conduct 
a correspondence study in which we randomly vary the photograph of the CV and all 
other information. The photographs represent three distinct racial phenotypes in 
Mexico: a Caucasian individual, a mestizo with light-brown skin, and a dark-brown 
skin individual who resembles the indigenous population the most. This study is 
particularly important in the Mexican context for two reasons. First, after 
independence there was an explicit effort to create a mestizo identity in the country 
(Aguilar, 2011). The idea that “we are all mestizos” is widespread, yet 24.5 percent 
of youth declare that they are discriminated against because of their physical 
appearance (ENADIS, 2011). Given the idea that Mexico is a mestizo country, there is 
no information on racial origin nor skin color in labor surveys. Hence, it is 
impossible to estimate any kind of labor market performance racial gap using official 
                                           
1 See the literature review section for more details on this literature. 
2 Such is the case of the United States with the white and black distinction, and Canada or other 
European countries with the white-native and immigrant distinction. 
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statistics.3,4 And second, as in many developing countries, employers explicitly ask 
applicants to include a photograph in their CVs. Thus the information on phenotype 
and physical appearance is explicitly conveyed in the CV, and used by employers in 
their at-point-of-hire decisions. 
Another dimension that we want to investigate on is marital status. It has long been 
hypothesized that employers may think that married females have lower 
productivity, and hence they may be more reluctant to hire them due to statistical 
discrimination. With this in mind, in our fictitious CVs we also varied marital status 
randomly for men and women. The provision of this kind of private information in 
the CVs is very standard in the Mexican context. So we will be testing how marital 
status affects callback rates of men and women. Moreover, we will be able to test 
whether there is statistical or preference-based discrimination by exploiting the 
interaction of marital status and phenotypes. The working hypothesis in this case is 
that if marriage affects productivity of females, it should affect it equally across 
phenotypes. 
Our research design consists on an audit study that will focus on recent college 
graduates. The reasons behind this choice are that online job searches for this group 
are more representative of the typical search, and that we do not introduce noise by 
having individuals with longer professional careers in which the experience may take 
a more prominent role as in Oreopoulos (2009). We sent comparable CVs to close to 
1,000 online job advertisements.5 To each job post, we sent 8 resumes on average 
varying the gender and the picture along with other observable characteristics of the 
fictitious applicants. The photographs represent three distinct phenotypes: 
Caucasian or European phenotype (white skin), the mestizo phenotype (light brown 
                                           
3 Some surveys have information on whether individuals speak an indigenous language. However, there 
is a large share of the population with an indigenous phenotype that only speaks Spanish. 
4 Some key Mexican studies on race discrimination include Béjar Navarro (1969) and Gall (2004) among 
others. None of these studies analyze the labor demand-side of the labor market as we do in this 
article. 
5 All job advertisements were posted by different firms. 
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skin), and the indigenous or dark mestizo phenotype. In the experiment, we built 10 
different sets of 8 resumes in which all characteristics, including experience, are 
random, such that we have substantial variation across CVs. The experimental 
design of the study allows us to test in a straightforward fashion if there is 
discrimination in the Mexican labor market: given that the education and experience 
in the CVs are randomly assigned, the gender, the physical characteristics and the 
marital status of the applicants should not determine the probability of getting a 
callback for an interview. 
For the more than 8,000 CVs we sent, our results indicate that women get 40 
percent more callbacks on average than men. Hence we do not find evidence of 
discrimination against women in the group of study. In terms of physical 
characteristics, we found that a Caucasian woman receives 23 per cent more 
callbacks than a woman with an indigenous phenotype. In the case of men, we do 
not find statistically significant differences in the callback rates among phenotypes. 
Moreover, there is a marriage penalty in terms of callbacks for women but not for 
men. This penalty is larger for women with Indigenous phenotype, when we do not 
control for firm characteristics. When we included a fixed effect in our estimates, we 
found that there is no heterogeneity suggesting that there may be statistical 
discrimination against married women. 
These results have important implications for the legislation on the labor market, 
and the promotion of equality in general, and public policies in Mexico and other 
developing countries. If individuals with the same education and labor experience 
receive a different treatment just because of their marital status or physical 
appearance, then there is no fostering of equality of opportunities or social mobility. 
For these reasons in many developed countries, employers are forbidden to ask 
personal information of the job applicant like marital status and racial background. 
Given that we found that these characteristics are used to discriminate against 
certain groups, it is desirable to improve the labor laws on these issues, and to 
prohibit explicitly the inclusion of personal information in the curriculum vitae. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the 
findings of the literature. In Section 3, we describe the experiment we conducted and 
the methodology used to analyze the data collected. In Section 4, we present 
descriptive statistics and the results of the econometric analysis. Finally, Section 5 
concludes and offers a discussion of public policies and regulations that are 
necessary to halt discriminatory behavior given our evidence. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature on discrimination using field experiments has grown exponentially in 
the last 30 years (Pager, 2007). We can find two main approaches in the literature: 
correspondence tests and in-person audits. In the correspondence tests, the 
researcher creates similar sets of fictitious resumes varying the trait of interest. For 
example, a pair of CVs has similar professional experience, but different gender. The 
goal in correspondence tests is to compare the callback rates between groups (in our 
previous example, between men and women). Given that the labor experience is 
comparable, if there is equality of opportunities, then the callback rates should not 
vary by gender. On the other hand, in-person audit studies match similar individuals 
on an observable characteristic. Then these individuals apply to jobs using in-person 
applications or interviews. The researcher trains the potential job applicants in order 
to reduce the bias for unobserved characteristics (for instance, the accent or the 
behavior during the interview). 
There are several advantages of correspondence test studies over in-person studies. 
First, correspondence test studies are less expensive than in-person studies. Second, 
the sample size may be considerable larger which increases statistical power 
calculations. Third, it is difficult to guarantee that potential job applicants in the in-
person studies will behave identically or in a very similar way.6 In the correspondence 
                                           
6 It is particularly worrisome that the behavior of the applicants varies in an unobservable fashion to the 
econometrician. For instance, it is possible that the individual representing the discriminated minority 
will try to compensate by having a better attitude or being more charismatic during the interview (after 
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test studies, we can be certain that CVs are comparable. Nevertheless, in some 
employment positions like entry-level jobs, job applicants are required to apply in 
person for the job position (Pager, Western and Bonikowski, 2009; Pager, 2007). In 
those cases, the correspondence study has limited impact. For the reasons just 
described, we implement a correspondence test study that limits to recent graduates 
from university. In Mexico, most of the job advertisements to recent college 
graduates require sending a CV by email. 
Correspondence test studies have been used to measure discrimination in the labor 
market and real estate market by race or ethnicity, gender, age, physical 
attractiveness and social background in the labor and housing market (see the 
excellent reviews by Pager, 2007, and Pager and Shepherd, 2008). Most of the 
correspondence studies refer to developed countries. Moreover, in general these 
studies show evidence of discrimination by race or ethnicity and age.  
In the United States, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) analyze the effect of race in 
the probability of callback. They sent similar resumes using “White names” like Greg 
and Emily and “Black names” like Jamal and Lakisha. They find that resumes with 
white names have a callback rate of 9.7 percent while resumes with black names 
have a callback rate of 6.5 percent. As they only vary the names of potential 
applicants, they argue that there is substantial race discrimination in the U.S. labor 
market. 
Similar studies have been carried out in other countries. For Canada, Oreopoulos 
(2009) finds that employers place more value on resumes with English-sounding 
names and Canadian education and labor experience as opposed to foreign-
sounding names (China, India or Pakistan) and foreign education and labor 
experience. For Sweden, there is ample evidence of discrimination against minorities 
in the labor market (Bursell, 2007; Carlsson and Rooth, 2007; Rooth, 2010) and in 
the housing market (Ahmed and Hammarstedt, 2008). In Australia, Booth et al. 
                                                                                                                                    
all, the subjects are actors). Or quite the contrary, that this individual has a bad attitude so that the 
study throws the expected results. This behavior is unobservable to the econometrician.  
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(2011) shows there is also discrimination against indigenous, Chinese or middle-
eastern names. Chinese and Middle easterners have to submit at least 50 percent 
more applications than Anglo-Saxons in order to get a similar callback rate. In 
Germany, Kaas and Manger (2009) find discrimination in favor of German sounding 
names and against Turkish sounding names. In the rental market in Greece, Drydakis 
(2011) shows evidence that the probability of receiving an appointment to a showing 
in the house-renting market is lower for Albanians than for Greeks. 
On the other hand, in developing countries there is little evidence of discrimination 
on the basis of social background or ethnicity. In Chile, Bravo et al. (2008) conduct a 
correspondence study in which they vary social class by name and surname as well 
as place of residence. They do not find any discrimination effect. In India, Banerjee et 
al. (2009) compare callback rates for Upper and Non-Upper caste names in software 
and call-center jobs. They only find evidence of discrimination in call-center jobs, but 
overall caste names do not affect callback rates. 
Correspondence studies have been used to study age and gender discrimination. 
Lahey (2008) shows that in the United States young applicants are 44 percent more 
likely to be offered an interview than old applicants. In general, the evidence of 
discrimination against older workers is similar to other countries: France (Petit, 
2007), Spain (Albert et al., 2011) and United Kingdom (Riach and Rich, 2007). The 
studies in France and Spain do not find any gender discrimination. Finally, Booth and 
Leigh (2010) find discrimination against males in female-dominated occupations. 
Some countries allow or require a picture in the resume. Some researchers have 
exploited this inclusion to examine the role of physical attractiveness on the 
probability of a callback. Rooth (2009) finds a negative differential treatment in 
hiring in Sweden for job applicants who are obese or unattractive. In Argentina, 
Lopez Boo et al. (2011) find that attractive individuals receive 36 percent more 
callbacks for interviews than unattractive individuals. In Peru, Moreno et al. (2004) 
find no gender or racial discrimination in the hiring process, however they do find 
that female adjust their expected wages by 7 percent below the average of expected 
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wages of males. Although there is no direct evidence of discrimination in the 
employment process using audit studies in Mexico, Aguilar (2011) tests whether 
ethnicity in fictitious political candidates matters. She finds that Mexicans vote more 
for fictitious candidates with “European” looks than with indigenous or mestizo 
looks.  
Our paper is closer to the contributions of Oreopoulos (2009) and Lopez Boo et al. 
(2011). Similar to the case of immigrants’ characteristics in Oreopoulos (2009), we 
are interested in the determinants of callbacks among recent college graduates. We 
are also interested on whether ethnicity and the notion of an “attractive” face (in 
terms of European vs. Mestizo phenotypes) is a determinant for callbacks. Moreover, 
we are interested on whether there is differential treatment by social background, as 
measured by the university in which individuals graduate, and marital status. 
3. Experimental setup and methodology 
In order to test whether gender and phenotype determine the callbacks for an 
interview, we constructed a bank of randomized CVs and a bank of job 
advertisements. A typical CV includes identity information (name, photograph, 
address, email, cell phone number, etc.), previous education, professional 
experience, hobbies and some additional information (like time availability and 
willingness to move to another city). On average, we sent 8 CVs to each job 
advertisement. These were determined on the basis of gender and phenotype (3 
phenotypes and a CV without picture as control).7 
We created CVs using experiences from CVs available online such that the 
professional experience of our fictitious candidates is realistic. Moreover, we 
contacted recent college graduates and asked them to modify the CVs as if they were 
                                           
7 In some cases the job advertisements specified the gender desired for the vacant position (only men, 
or only women), ask for a photograph in the CV, or other characteristics of the applicants. We sent less 
than 8 CVs to these ads: 4 CVs in the first example, and 6 in the second. 
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their own. For the names, we used 8 of the most common names and surnames in 
Mexico. We chose mainly surnames ending with “ez”, because in Mexico these 
surnames are very common and they are not associated with social background.8 
Following Lahey & Beasley (2009), we randomized characteristics across CVs9 and 
created 10 sets of 8 CVs each for six different majors and two experience levels;10 
hence, our bank of CVs has 960 different CVs. Each name was associated to a 
Gmail© account and a cell phone number.11 The characteristics of the CVs are 
randomized, so on average each photograph has a CV of the same quality.  
In order to distinguish phenotypes, we took pictures of three men and three women 
representing the phenotypes. The pictures have a white background and the subjects 
wear similar attires.12 The pictures were taken with the express consent of the 
subjects, who granted us written permission to use their image in the experiment. 
We explained to each subject the nature of the experiment; and the way in which we 
would use their image during the experiment.13 For the purpose of this study, we 
define a European phenotype as a white person. It is important to mention that our 
definition is not necessarily related to a particular color of the eyes or the hair. The 
next phenotype we defined is the mestizo, whose skin is a light shade. Finally, the 
indigenous phenotype is a dark-skinned individual.  It is important to clarify that a 
                                           
8 We chose the following names: Alejandro Flores Álvarez, Antonio González Lara, Carlos Romero 
Gómez, Javier Rodríguez Mendoza, Claudia García Ramírez, Gabriela López Acosta, Mariana Hernández 
Silva, Mónica Vázquez Rivera. According to Instituto Federal Electoral (2012), to Mateos (2010) and to 
the Baby Center website (2011) these names are very common in Mexico. 
9 For example, we randomized pictures, universities and high schools from which they graduated, 
professional experience, marital status, addresses, hobbies, and any additional information.  
10 We selected the following majors: business administration, public accounting, economics, industrial 
engineering, engineering in electronics and telecommunications, and engineering in computational 
systems. We will explain why we chose those majors further ahead.  
11 Those were the means through which the firms could contact our fictitious applicants.  
12 Women wore a black blazer and a soft-toned blouse; men, a dark suit, white shirt and a tie with 
discrete patterns. We also attached colored pictures so that the physical characteristics are better 
observed by the employers.  
13 Please refer to Appendix A to see the photographs. 
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subject labeled as indigenous is not necessarily a native of the Americas. These 
types of individuals resemble native Americans more than mestizos in the color of 
their skin and facial features. In Mexico, it is widely recognized that a European 
appearance is preferred to a mestizo appearance, which is also preferred to an 
indigenous appearance (Aguilar, 2011). In fact, the word “indio” (Indian) is still an 
insult in Mexico.14 In our experiment, we are particularly interested on the existence 
of this preference for European looks. This preference would result in a higher 
callback rate to the applications of European-looking individuals as compared to the 
mestizos or the indigenous ones, even when all other information in the CVs is the 
same on average. 
We also randomized the universities where the applicants went to college. We used 
do public universities and three private universities, all them widely known in Mexico 
City. An employer can discriminate an indigenous-looking individual. However, we 
would also like to test whether this type of discrimination is independent of the type 
of university attended by the individual. In Mexico, employers prefer the graduates 
of some private universities than those of public ones (for instance, the newspaper 
Reforma, 2012, reports university rankings).15,16 In the CV, we also randomized the 
marital status. It is very common in Mexico that the CV includes such personal 
information; in fact some employers explicitly ask for that kind of information. This 
is quite in contrast to what is legally allowed in developed countries. 
As for the job advertisements, we only focused on those requesting candidates with 
zero to three years of experience, given that we are analyzing the market for recent 
                                           
14 There are anthropological studies which present those cases. See, for instance, Oehmichen (2006) 
and Wade (2009). 
15 In order to build the index, Reforma takes into account the opinion of the employers about college 
graduates. 
16 It is important to mention that just sent CVs to firms looking for employers online. One can argue 
that network effects are more important in private than in public universities (mouth-to-mouth 
recommendations or than the information on vacancies is kept within the firm). We cannot test the 
existence of those effects. Hence, our results should be interpreted as the impact of universities on 
callbacks derived from online job postings, and not as the impact in the whole labor market. 
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college graduates. The graduates are confined to the following majors: business 
administration, public accounting, economics, industrial engineering, engineering on 
electronics and telecommunications, and engineering on computational systems. 
These majors were selected to try to maximize the number of job ads available 
before the beginning of the experiment; and also to achieve some gender balance 
among the graduates. We found that 48 percent of the graduates in those majors of 
the 2007-2008 class were women (ANUIES, 2009). Hence, given a relatively balanced 
distribution of graduates we would expect a relatively balance callback rate in the 
absence of discrimination. 
We sent the CVs from October 2011 to May 2012. We collected the job ads 
information on a weekly basis from internet websites commonly used to publicize 
and look for jobs in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City.17 For each job ad we 
collected some information on the job characteristics, but the ads did not allow us to 
collect information on the firm (such as the firm size, revenues, and the like) or on 
the specifics of the job position within the firm (such as whether there is contact 
with customers or clients and the hierarchy within the firm).18 If the advertisement 
was looking only for women, we just sent women’s CVs. If the ad had some 
requirements on languages or programming skills, then we added all requirements 
to all CVs sent to that ad.  
In order not to raise suspicions about the experiment, we did not send all the CVs at 
the same time. We scheduled the deliveries of emails at different times within two 
consecutive days using Boomerang©.19 The employer could make contact with the 
applicant via email or cell phone, so each name was associated with a cell phone 
number and an email account. If the firm contacted the applicant to schedule an 
                                           
17 The websites were OCC Mundial (http://www.occ.com.mx/) y CompuTrabajo 
(http://www.computrabajo.com.mx/). 
18 The reason for this lack of firm and job position data is that the job ad is too general and does not 




interview, we registered the callback. These are the callbacks that we use to estimate 
the probability of a callback in our econometric model.20 
In sum, in most of the cases we sent 8 CVs per job advertisement. In each set of CVs 
we included 4 men and 4 women. For each gender, we randomized universities, 
marital status, and a picture representing 3 characteristic phenotypes, so we left a 
CV without picture as a control. When the employers called to schedule an interview 
with the applicant, we recorded the callback as a success. These callbacks will be 
used as our dependent variable in the econometric model presented below. 
Given that the information on the CVs is randomly assigned, if the employers are 
only interested on the candidates’ qualifications, then gender, marital status or 
phenotype should not matter in the callback decision. We are therefore interested on 
three results. First, we want to test whether employers have a strict gender 
preference when presented with both options. Second, we want to whether if there is 
discrimination against people with facial features which are close to the indigenous 
one. Finally, we want to test whether marital status affects callback rates. We will 
thus estimate the following statistics:21 
𝐸[𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘|𝑊𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛] − 𝐸[𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘|𝑀𝑎𝑛] (1) 
𝐸[𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘|𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒] − 𝐸[𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘|𝐷𝑎𝑟𝑘] (2) 
𝐸[𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘|𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒] − 𝐸[𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘|𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑] (3) 
                                           
20 In order to avoid having problems with the employers and to avoid having follow-up call, right after 
recording the callback, our research assistants informed the firms that they were pleased for the 
interest in their application, but that they had already found a job. 
21 We will also condition the estimates of (2)-(4) on gender. 
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A statistical difference in equations (1)-(3) may be interpreted as discrimination. The 
literature on discrimination in economics distinguishes between preference-based 
discrimination and statistical discrimination. There is preference-based 
discrimination when the employer derives disutility from having certain type of 
people among his employees. This disutility is reflected on a higher psychic cost of 
hiring those people. On the other hand, statistical discrimination exists due to 
information asymmetries about workers’ productivities: the employer has a prior 
about the productivity of people based on some observable characteristic like marital 
status, gender or race (Arrow, 1998; Dickinson and Oaxaca, 2006; Phelps 1972). In 
our case, the employer may expect single to married women because they expect 
single women to be more productive.22 Similarly, the employer may think that 
European-looking people are more productive, and hence they call them back with a 
higher probability. However, as Phelps (1972) states “[d]iscrimination is no less 
damaging to its victims for being statistical. And it is no less important for social 
policy to counter.”23 For this reason, in this article we do not aim to find out the 
source of discrimination. However, some relevant comparison between specific 
groups may provide suggestive evidence on the type of discrimination. 
We can formalize the expression above with the following estimating equation: 
Pr�𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗 = 1�𝐺𝑖𝑗 ,𝑅𝑖𝑗 ,𝑈𝑖𝑗 ,𝑋𝑖𝑗 ,𝑊𝑗� = Pr (𝛼𝐺𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑈𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝑊𝑗) (4) 
where 𝑖 denotes individual y 𝑗 the ad/firm, the dependent variable is an indicator of 
whether the firm contacted the applicant, 𝐺 denotes gender; 𝑅, the phenotype 
(European, mestizo, and indigenous), 𝑈 is the type of college attended, and 𝑋 and 𝑊 
are control variables of the individual and the ad, respectively. Our control variables 
include age, major dummies, and dummies for scholarships, public high schools, 
                                           
22 For instance, married women may ask for more days off in order to take care of sick children. 
23 Phelps (1972), p. 661. Statistical discrimination is as damaging as preference-based discrimination 
because if a high-productivity individual belongs to a group with a low average productivity, that 
individual will be considered to be low productivity when she is not. 
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foreign language proficiency, time availability and leadership activities within the 
university. In all the regressions we estimate standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level.  
The parameters of interest in the regression of equation (4) are the coefficients on 
gender, phenotype, university and marital status. In order to present some evidence 
on the existence of preference-based labor market discrimination we will interact the 
phenotype with marital status in equation (4), and we will run the regression on 
some subsamples of interest.24 
4. Results 
A. Descriptive results 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the fictitious job applicants. Overall, 
employers post more ads requiring “only women” than “only men”. There are more 
job ads for majors on business than on engineering. In fact, 71 percent of all 
fictitious applicants graduated from business majors. Given the random assignment 
that we established, 62 percent of the applicants graduated from a public university. 
By the same token, and consistent with the parameters we established, 27 percent of 
individuals are married and the average age is 24.5 years. The CVs also include 
information on scholarships, foreign languages and availability of extra time and to 
move to another city. These aspects are included in order to analyze if they are an 
important factor in the determination of a callback. 
[Table 1 about here] 
                                           
24 For example, assume that there is statistical discrimination against married women in the labor 
market. That is, the employers expect that married women are going to be less productive than single 
women on average. This prior expectation may be due to a higher absenteeism among married women 
given their care-giving responsibilities in the household. Then we would expect that an interaction 
between marital status and phenotype in regression (4) will not any additional effect on the probability 
of a callback after controlling for the levels of those two variables. 
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Table 2 shows the callback rates by gender, major, type of university, marital status 
and time availability. Most of the differences are not statistically significant (the table 
only includes the t-statistics for the statistically significant tests). However, women 
receive a higher proportion of callbacks than men. The difference between women 
and men is 4.2 percentage points. In other words, men need to send 40 percent 
more job applications in order to get the same number of callbacks than women. 
Approximately for every 20 job applications sent, men receive around 2 calls and 
women receive 3 calls.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The callback rates are similar for individuals who majored in business and from 
public universities for both genders. Notwithstanding, we noticed that there is a 
gender gap in the callback rates, which is larger of business graduates (4.8 
percentage points) than for engineering (2.9 percentage points). Similarly, the 
gender gap is larger for private universities (5.2 percentage points) than for public 
universities (3.7 percentage points). All these gaps are statistically significant. 
The callback rate for single applicants is 13.1 percent and for married applicants, 
12.3 percent; the difference is not statistically significant. However, there is a large 
heterogeneity when we analyze men and women separately. The callback rate is 11.5 
and 10.3 percent for married and single men, respectively. In contrast, single women 
have a larger callback rate than married women; the difference is 2.5 percentage 
points and it is statistically significant. Additionally, the gender gap is larger among 
single individuals than among married individuals. So our results point out that 
employers do not care about the marital status of men, but they do take into account 
the marital status of women. 
Finally, the inclusion of time availability in the CV does not matter for a callback, 
even after we split the sample by gender. Apparently, employers do not even read 
this part of the CV (which is place at the end) given that in all cases those who do 
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not provide that information seem to receive more callbacks than the rest of the 
applicants. Nevertheless, even when we split the sample by availability, women 
continue to receive more callbacks than men in every case. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 3 presents the callback rates by gender and phenotype (European, mestizo, 
indigenous and without picture), and the p-value of the Pearson independence test. 
We found that the phenotype is correlated with the callback rate only for women. In 
the case of men, even when European-looking men have a larger callback rate than 
indigenous-looking men (or those without a picture), the difference is not 
statistically significant. In contrast, there are statistically significant differences 
between women with a European phenotype and those with an indigenous 
phenotype (or without a picture). European-looking women have 23 percent more 
callbacks tan indigenous-looking women, and 34 percent more callbacks tan women 
who did not include a picture on their CVs. It is surprising to find these differences 
only for women. If we believe that employers discriminate statistically in favor of 
attractive people because they expect them to be more productive, then we would 
expect to observe the same differences among men and women, but we only 
observe them for women. 
Table 3 also includes the callback rates by marital status and the type of college 
attended. For women, we found that European-looking singles have a larger callback 
rate than their married counterparts. This marriage penalty is even higher for those 
with an indigenous phenotype and those without a picture. In fact, the lowest 
callback rate that we wound in our sample is for married indigenous-looking women. 
As a result, the callback rate of married Caucasian women is 61 percent larger than 
the callback rate of married women with indigenous appearance. It is important to 
notice that married women with a mestizo look have a premium with respect to their 
single counterparts. We do not observe any type of marriage penalty for men, if any 
we observe a relatively larger callback rate for married indigenous-looking men. 
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The results from tables 2 and 3 imply that, in general, employers prefer to call single 
women to married women, whereas for men marital status does not play any role. 
However, the marriage penalty for women differs according to phenotypes. Statistical 
discrimination against married women would suggest a similar penalty for all women 
independently of phenotype (that is, employers would expect a lower productivity 
from all married women). This result is no consistent with our data, which suggests 
that preference-based discrimination may be present in the Mexican labor market. 
B. Econometric results 
Table 4 presents the estimation of equation (4) using all the sample, and Table 5 
restricts the estimation to women. The results are similar to those described in the 
previous subsection, which is consistent with the randomization of the information 
in the CVs. The tables include six columns in which we vary the omitted photo 
dummy variable or subsets of photo dummies. The first five columns do not control 
for firm fixed effects; those are included in Column (6).25 All regressions control for 
age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for 
foreign language, and a leadership dummy. The standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level to control for error correlation 
within the firm. 
Table 4 shows that the probability that women receive a callback is 4.3 percentage 
points higher than that of men. That is, women receive 40 percent more callbacks 
than men. This result is robust to the inclusion of marital status, dummies for 
phenotypes (photos) and all other control variables. This result was rather 
unexpected. However we think that it may be a result of the self-selection process of 
women graduating from college and participating in the labor market. These 
selection processes may signal employers of high productivity in the case of women, 
                                           
25 The results are similar if we estimate the marginal effects in a logistic or normal probability model. 
The main reason for using a linear probability model is precisely the inclusion of firm fixed effects in 
the model. Tables B1 to B3 in Appendix B show the results using a probit model. We do not show the 
results of the logit estimation for simplicity, but they are very similar to those of the probit and the 
linear probability models.  
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but not in the case of men. As such, there may be unobservable characteristics 
which are unobserved by the econometrician, but which may help employers on their 
hiring decisions. This may be interpreted as statistical discrimination against males. 
We provide a test on this on the robustness subsection. The results are consistent 
with the descriptive analysis in the sense that having attended a public university 
and being married do not have any effect on the probability of a callback when we 
consider both men and women in the estimations. 
[Table 4 about here] 
As for phenotypes, the results show that the European phenotype has a higher 
callback rate as shown in Column (2). Individuals with a European appearance have a 
callback rate 2.5 percentage points larger than indigenous phenotypes (omitted 
category). Mestizos have a callback rate 1.7 percentage points higher than 
indigenous phenotypes. However, there is no statistically significant difference 
between the callback rates of indigenous applicants and those without a photo in 
their CVs. Columns (3) to (5) change the phenotype of reference and the results are 
qualitatively similar. That is, we always find that European or mestizo phenotypes 
have a higher callback rate than indigenous phenotypes or CVs without a photo.  
Column (6) includes firm fixed effects and the results hold. This column controls for 
all unobserved factors at the firm level like the firm size, sales, industry and so on. 
Hence, the biases introduced by the firm’s type are eliminated with the introduction 
of firm fixed effects. These fixed effects also control for the fact that some firms 
demand only men or only women. For this reason, the coefficient on Women is the 
only one that changes in a significant way. These results imply that even within firms 
women and European phenotypes are preferred, and that the results are not a 
consequence of the firms demanding certain characteristics from their employees. 




Table 5 shows the results when we restrict the sample to women.26 Public 
universities are irrelevant to receive a call. However, and in contrast to men, marital 
status does have an impact on the female callback rates. Married females have a 
callback rate between 2.7 and 3 percentage points less than single women (columns 
[1] to [5]). A European phenotype also exhibits a higher callback rate than all other 
phenotypes. Specifically, European-looking women have a callback rate 3.3 
percentage points higher than indigenous phenotypes. Hence, “indigenous” females 
need to send 23 percent more CVs to receive the same number of calls than whites.  
As in Table 4, we introduce firm fixed effects in Column (6) of Table 5. Even when 
controlling for unobserved firm characteristics, the marital status continues to be 
important in the firm’s decision to call back. The significance of the coefficient drops 
due to the small number of married females in the sample (26 percent). Similarly, 
even after adding firm fixed effects, firms still prefer European phenotypes to 
indigenous ones. 
C. Extensions 
In order to further test whether the marital status has differential effects depending 
on gender, phenotype and other characteristics, we present the estimates in tables 6 
and 7. These tables will allow us to show evidence on the existence of preference-
based or statistical discrimination. Recall that if there is statistical discrimination 
against married women, we would expect the marriage penalty to be similar across 
phenotypes. Table 6 presents the results when we add interactions of marital status 
and phenotypes. Column (1) shows that there is a marriage penalty of 6.3 
percentage points in the probability of a callback. Being European does not entail 
                                           
26 We also estimated the regressions for the sample of men, but none of the relevant variables are of 
significance in the determination of a callback. That is, in the case of men, the firms do not use any of 
the personal information in the CV on the callback decision. Only in the case when we combined the 
European and Mestizo photos in a single dummy is the coefficient statistically significant at 10%. The 
coefficient is significant at 5% only in the case when the omitted groups are indigenous and no photo. 
When we split the phenotypes and estimate the coefficients for European and mestizo photos separately 
the estimations are not robust. These results are presented in Appendix C, Table C1. 
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any additional penalty as compared to all other groups. However, when we control 
for mestizo photographs in Columns (2) and (3), we find that mestizo females 
receive more calls than any other group. We do not find a marriage penalty in the 
case of males (columns 4 to 6); if anything we find a premium for being married, 
though the coefficient is only significant at 10% in Column (6). In the case of men, 
we do not see a phenotype-differentiated premium or penalty. Hence, given that 
there are heterogeneous effects of marriage on females according to phenotypes, it 
is possible that there is preference-based discrimination against married indigenous 
females. 
[Table 6 about here] 
However, in Table 7 we estimate the same specifications as in Table 6, but we 
added firm fixed effects. Once we include firm controls the effect of marriage is 
smaller in magnitude as in Table 5, and in one case it becomes statistically 
insignificant due to the larger standard errors. More interestingly, the 
heterogeneity of marriage across female phenotypes disappears as a result of a 
large drop in the coefficient of the interaction between mestizo females and 
being married. The results for males remain constant, but the marginally 
statistical significant marriage premium that we had found in Table 6 also 
vanishes (see Column (6) in Table 7). Hence, the results in Table 6 may be driven 
by some firms in the market. 
[Table 7 about here] 
D. Robustness of results 
Heckman and Sigelman (1993) argue that one could find discrimination in 
correspondence studies when there is actually none, even when observable 
characteristics are similar. The reason is that if the variance of unobservable 
characteristics differs across groups, then this could lead us to find discrimination. 
Neumark (2010) provides an elegant derivation of this critique, and shows that we 
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can empirically test for the presence of heteroskedasticity across the groups of 
interest in correspondence studies. He proposes the estimation of a probit that 
allows for heteroskedasticity on the variables used to determine the existence of 
discrimination. We follow Neumark’s test and assume that heteroskedasticity is 
distributed as an exponential.27 
[Table 8 about here] 
The null hypothesis of this test is that the variance of unobservable characteristics is 
constant across groups. We use this Neumark’s test to provide evidence on two 
hypotheses. First, we want to test whether our results on physical phenotypes are 
spurious correlation.  Table 8 presents the results of the heteroskedastic probit 
where we performed the test suggested by Neumark (2010). We assumed that the 
heteroskedasticity is only due to marital status or European phenotypes (or both). 
The inclusion of heteroskedasticity in the model complicates the identification of the 
parameters, so we are going to observe an increase in the standard errors of the 
marginal effects of the photos and marital status. In spite of that power loss, the 
results are similar to those presented in previous tables. The takeaway from Table 8 
is that the null of variance equality across groups cannot be rejected. Hence 
Heckman and Sigelman’s (1993) critique does not apply in our case. We can interpret 
our results on phenotype and marital status as discrimination. 
Finally, we want to test whether the higher callback rates for females are due to 
differences in the variance of unobservables across gender categories. As we 
discussed before, female college graduates who are participating in the labor market 
may signal higher productivity than similar males due to a self-selection process. As 
econometricians, we do not know of this signal and hence we cannot control for it. 
However we can use Neumark’s test to provide some evidence on it. We ran the test 
                                           
27 That is, we assume that 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀) = [exp(𝛾𝐷)]2, so the variance of the unobservables follows an 
exponential distribution, where 𝐷 defines the groups of interest. The null hypothesis is that 𝛾 = 0. 
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using different specifications and found that the variance of the unobservables is 
indeed related to gender (results not shown), and hence our hypothesis seems likely. 
As Neumark himself points out, “the idea that the variances of unobservables differ 
across groups has a long tradition in research on discrimination, stemming from 
early models of statistical discrimination” (p.8). Hence, we can interpret the latter 
test as evidence of the existence of statistical discrimination across gender 
categories. In the former test on phenotypes and marriage, we can discard that 
statistical discrimination has its source on difference in group variances; however, 
we cannot discard other models of statistical discrimination. 
E. Interpretation of results 
In tables 4 and 5 we found that women have on average a higher callback rate than 
men. In the case of men we do not find a differential callback rate across 
phenotypes, marital status or type of university attended. So, the employers do not 
seem to prefer a specific type of male applicant. In contrast, employers do 
discriminate certain types of women. In particular, European-looking females have a 
higher callback rate than their indigenous counterparts. Moreover, there is a penalty 
for being married for European and indigenous phenotypes, but the penalty is much 
larger in the case of married females with an indigenous appearance. 
The results in tables 6 and 7 present suggestive evidence in favor of statistical 
discrimination against married women. We explained that statistical discrimination 
would suggest that the marriage penalty is the same for women. If marriage has an 
impact on productivity, this impact should be the same for all women independently 
of phenotype. Our fixed effects models confirm this expected result. However the 
findings on the preference for Caucasian women may be more consistent with 
preference-based discrimination. We found that none of the variables that may have 
signaled greater productivity such as being single, coming from a private university, 
and time availability make a dent on the higher callback for white women. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions 
Most societies aspire to offer equality of opportunities to their members. Any form 
of discrimination would deter societies’ efforts to reach that goal. Colonial societies 
have a wide range of skin colors in their populations. This diversity tends to 
generate discrimination against their darker members thus preventing a non-
negligible portion of the populace of equality of opportunities. In this paper we 
wanted to test if there is racial discrimination in a society in which the racial divide is 
not between blacks and whites, nor natives and immigrants, but a range of skin 
colors from white to dark brown. With this goal in mind, we conducted a 
correspondence study in which we varied the information in fictitious CVs. We sent 
approximately 8,000 CVs responding to around 1,000 online job advertisements. In 
each set of 8 CVs we included 4 men and 4 women. Each CV was distinguished by a 
photograph representing 3 phenotypes (Caucasian, mestizo, and indigenous) and 
one CV did not have a picture as a control. Hence, we are particularly interested on 
gender and race discrimination among youths. 
We found that women have on average a higher callback rate than men. Women 
receive 40 percent more calls. So, we do not find any evidence on discrimination 
against women in our study; in any case, we found evidence of discrimination 
against men. As discussed the selection of women into college graduation and the 
labor market may signal a higher productivity than in the case of men. We find 
evidence that this estimate is a result of differences in the variance of unobservables 
between men and women by means of a heteroskedastic probit. As for 
discrimination based on physical appearance, women with a European phenotype 
receive more calls than women with an indigenous phenotype. Specifically, a 
Caucasian woman receives 23 percent more calls than an “indigenous-looking” 
woman. In the case of men, we do not find any statistically significant differences 
across phenotypes. Having graduated from a public university has no impact on the 
callback rate in our sample of job ads. 
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Although disentangling the type of discrimination is not the objective of this paper, 
we provide some suggestive evidence on the existence of statistical discrimination in 
the Mexican labor market. If there were statistical discrimination, and thus 
employers are only concerned with expected productivity, then we should observe 
that groups with a given characteristic are equally discriminated. For example, 
married women should receive fewer calls than single women independently of the 
phenotype. Our results confirm this implication from statistical discrimination. 
Initially, we find that the marriage penalty is not the same across phenotypes: the 
callback rate gap between European- and indigenous-looking females increases when 
they are married, and mestizo females have a premium for being married. However, 
this heterogeneity vanishes when we include firm fixed effect. Thus the marriage 
penalty is the same for all marred women independently of the phenotype. We 
cannot say the same regarding the preference for white women over mestizo or 
indigenous looking women, which may be more in line with preference-based 
discrimination. We can thus conclude that employers are driven by both productivity 
beliefs and tastes in their hiring decisions. 
Our study has several drawbacks. First, job seekers use different means to search for 
a job and we are only focusing on online job searches. This could potentially bias the 
impact of private universities, since these could rely on networks to find placements 
for their graduates in the labor market. Second, we restrict the analysis to an age 
group in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City. Third, we do not have information on 
the firm and lack some information about the job position within the firm. Fourth, 
our discrimination measure is limited to only the first contact in the hiring process. 
We do not have information on starting wages or the actual hires, which would allow 
us to have arguably more relevant measures of discrimination. And finally, the 
results on correspondence tests may be a result of differences in the variance of 
unobservables across groups as suggested by Heckman and Sigelman (1993) and 
Neumark (2010).  
Here are our answers to these critiques. The first critique is valid, and for this reason 
we do not generalize our results to the whole labor market. Our results are only valid 
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for online searches. Second, future research should focus on other age groups and 
regions to analyze the robustness of our results. We are confident that our results 
are robust to other regions and majors because the major included in our study 
represent 36 percent of the graduating classes and Mexico City’s Metropolitan Area 
has the highest concentration of both public and private universities in Mexico. 
Third, it would be interesting to extend our study to analyze discrimination by the 
type of firm. However, our results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. 
Future research should also collect data on the job positions within the firm to 
analyze discrimination by job position. Fourth, an analysis of wage discrimination or 
hiring discrimination would require an in-person audit. As we mentioned in our 
literature review, in-person audits cannot fully control for unobservable behavior of 
the interviewees, which could bias the results. And in order to address the last 
critique, we performed the test suggested by Neumark (2010) and did not find any 
evidence that our results are a product of heteroskedasticity stemming from marital 
status and phenotypes. 
Our findings have important implications for public policy in developing countries, 
and particularly for Mexico. It is clear that employers should not require personal 
information and photographs in the applicants’ CVs. For instance, in the United 
States the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “is responsible for 
enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job applicant or 
an employee because of the person's race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), 
national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information.”28 However, in 
most Latin American countries, and Mexico is not an exception, it is not illegal for 
employers to ask for personal information in the curriculums, which includes marital 
status and a photograph.29   
                                           
28 Taken from http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/. 
29 This practice is strictly forbidden in the United States. For instance, visit the EEOC website, where you 
can find the following prohibition: “employers should not ask for a photograph of an applicant. If 
needed for identification purposes, a photograph may be obtained after an offer of employment is 
made and accepted” (EEOC, 2012) 
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The Mexican labor law is ambiguous on what is allowed and prohibited when it 
comes to discrimination. The 3rd article of the Federal Labor Law states that “No 
distinction may be made between employees on the basis of race, sex, age, religion, 
political views or social background.” The term “employees” is problematic here, 
since it entails that there exists an employer-employee relationship among parties. 
This relationship is absent among job seekers and employers, which would allow 
discrimination against a job applicant. The law should explicitly forbid discrimination 
based on physical appearance or phenotype. The Federal Labor Law also establishes 
in its 9th article Section III that the following behavior is considered discriminatory: 
“Prohibiting the free access to employment; or restricting the access to, tenure in or 
promotion in the job.” However, the explicit requirement of a photograph (racial 
features included) and marital status in CVs facilitates the restriction to access 
employment for reasons unrelated to aptitude for the job position. 
The evidence in this paper shows that the inclusion of private information, such as 
the marital status and a photograph, may be detrimental for young applicants. As we 
mentioned in the introduction, youth idleness halts human capital investments 
during a crucial stage of the life cycle. Moreover, if indigenous phenotypes are 
somehow correlated with social background, then the inclusion of a photograph may 
even inhibit social mobility. In sum, Mexico could take a big step in the promotion of 
equality of opportunities by prohibiting employers to require the disclosure of 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the sample of sent 
fictitious CVs 
  All Men Women 
A. Gender 
Men 0.49 
  Women 0.51 
  B. Major 
Business 0.71 0.70 0.73 
Engineering 0.29 0.30 0.27 
C. University 
Public 0.62 0.64 0.61 
Private 0.38 0.36 0.39 
D. Marital status 
Married 0.27 0.29 0.26 
E. Other characteristics 
Age 24.5 24.6 24.4 
Scholarship 0.26 0.23 0.28 
Leadership 0.50 0.49 0.51 
Foreign languages 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Time availability 0.50 0.51 0.50 
Sample size (N) 8149 3992 4157 
Notes: Estimates by the authors based on the sample of sent fictitious 
CVs. All variables are dichotomous with the exception of age. Business 
majors include accounting, business administration and economics; 
engineering majors include electronics and telecommunications, 
computational systems and industrial engineering.  
  
Table 2: Callback rates (percentages) 












Business 13.20 10.72 15.48 5.41 
Engineering 11.97 10.57 13.45 2.16 
C. University 
Public 12.82 10.97 14.67 4.35 
Private 12.90 10.13 15.35 3.95 
D. Marital status 
Married 12.31 11.51 13.12 
 





E. Other characteristics 
Available 12.50 11.52 14.78 3.08 
Not available 13.21 9.86 15.10 5.09 
Notes: Estimates by the authors. The t-statists are from a test of the difference in 




Table 3: Callback rates by phenotype 
  European Mestizo Indigenous No photo p-value 
A. Women 
     All 17.05 15.78 13.82 12.76 0.03 
Single 17.93 15.02 15.06 14.03 0.19 
Married 14.80 18.37 9.21 10.10 0.01 
Public university 16.69 15.63 13.18 12.93 0.15 
Private university 17.71 15.98 15.07 12.53 0.24 
B. Men 
     All 11.53 11.40 9.97 9.64 0.41 
Single 11.53 11.04 8.58 9.92 0.25 
Married 11.52 12.29 13.23 9.09 0.43 
Public university 11.93 12.20 10.05 9.46 0.31 
Private university 10.89 9.76 9.84 9.97 0.95 
Notes: Estimations by the authors. The last column "p-value" is the probability value of the 
Pearson independence test. The null hypothesis is that there is independence across columns 
within the category represented by the row, and the statistic is distributed as a chi-squared.  
 
Table 4: Econometric results: All  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Woman 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.035*** 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Public university -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Married -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 -0.003 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] 









Photo 2 (Mestizo) 
 
0.017** 



















Photo 1 & 2 (European 





  Photo 2 & 4 (mestizo and 
no photo)     
0.006 
 
    
[0.006] 
 Firm fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
N 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered 
at the firm level. *** (**) denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%). All regressions control for age, business dummy, 
scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign language, and a leadership dummy. The 
coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of them are not statistically significant, with the exception 
of the business major). Columns (1) to (5) do not include firm fixed effects. The results are similar when using 




Table 5: Econometric results: Women 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Public university -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012 
 
[0.010] [0.011] [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.008] 
Married -0.028** -0.028** -0.027** -0.027** -0.030** -0.018* 
 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.011] 









Photo 2 (Mestizo) 
 
0.019* 



















Photo 1 & 2 (European 





  Photo 2 & 4 (mestizo and 
no photo)     
0.006 
 
    
[0.009] 
 Firm fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
N 4,157 4,157 4,157 4,157 4,157 4,157 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered 
at the firm level. *** (**) [*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) [10%]. All regressions control for age, business 
dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign language, and a leadership dummy. The 
coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of them are not statistically significant, with the exception 
of the business major). Columns (1) to (5) do not include firm fixed effects. The results are similar when using 






Table 6: Econometric results by marital status and gender: Women 
  Women Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Married -0.029** -0.056*** -0.063*** 0.010 0.015 0.041* 
 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.023] [0.013] [0.015] [0.022] 
Photo 1 0.030** 0.029** 0.025* 0.014 0.020* 0.026** 
 



















Photo 1 x Married -0.004 0.026 0.033 -0.007 -0.012 -0.038 
 
[0.028] [0.029] [0.033] [0.025] [0.027] [0.032] 


















Firm fixed effects N N N N N N 
N 4,157 4,157 4,157 3,992 3,992 3,992 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered 
at the firm level. *** (**) [*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) [10%]. All regressions control for age, business 
dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign language, and a leadership dummy. The 
coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of them are not statistically significant, with the exception 
of the leadership dummy for males). The results are similar when using marginal effects in a logit or probit (see Table 





Table 7: Econometric results by marital status and gender: Women Fixed effects model 
  Women Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Married -0.028** -0.029* -0.026 0.001 0.002 0.016 
 
[0.013] [0.016] [0.021] [0.011] [0.013] [0.018] 
Photo 1 0.022** 0.029** 0.029** 0.009 0.015 0.016 
 



















Photo 1 x Married 0.027 0.030 0.027 0.016 0.015 0.001 
 
[0.023] [0.025] [0.028] [0.021] [0.023] [0.026] 


















Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
N 4,157 4,157 4,157 3,992 3,992 3,992 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered 
at the firm level. *** (**) [*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) [10%]. All regressions control for age, business 
dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign language, and a leadership dummy. The 
coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of them are not statistically significant).  
 
Table 8: Difference on the variance of unobservables: Women 
  [1] [2] [3] 
Married -0.026 -0.004 -0.017 
 
[0.027] [0.017] [0.023] 
Photo 1 (European) 0.012 0.045 0.089 
 
[0.040] [0.068] [0.226] 
Photo 2 (Mestizo) 0.015 0.022 0.022 
 
[0.043] [0.014] [0.023] 
No photo 0.000 -0.012 -0.007 
  [0.006] [0.013] [0.014] 
Heteroskedasticity  












N 4,157 4,157 4,157 
Notes: Estimations by the authors using heteroskedastic probit. The coefficients 
presented are marginal effects. We asume heteroskedasticity has an exponential 
distribution. Standard errors in brackets are robust and clustered at the firm level. *** (**) 
[*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) [10%].  All regressions control for age, 
business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign 
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Appendix B – Estimation results using a probit model 
Table B1: Econometric results: All  
Probit model 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Woman 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Public university 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] 
Married -0.011 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.011 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 









Photo 2 (Mestizo) 
 
0.017** 
   
  
[0.007] 










 Photo 1 & 2 (European and 





 Photo 2 & 4 (mestizo and no 
photo)     
0.006 
    
[0.006] 
N 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 8,149 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust 
and clustered at the firm level. *** (**) denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%). All regressions control 
for age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign 
language, and a leadership dummy. The coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of 







Table B2: Econometric results: Women  
Probit model 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Public university -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 
 
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] 
Married -0.028** -0.028** -0.028** -0.027** -0.030** 
 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 









Photo 2 (Mestizo) 
 
0.020* 
   
  
[0.010] 










 Photo 1 & 2 (European and 





 Photo 2 & 4 (mestizo and no 
photo)     
0.007 
    
[0.009] 
N 4,157 4,157 4,157 4,157 4,157 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets 
are robust and clustered at the firm level. *** (**) [*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) 
[10%]. All regressions control for age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school 
dummy, dummies for foreign language, and a leadership dummy. The coefficients on the 
control variables are not presented (all of them are not statistically significant, with the 






Table B3: Econometric results by marital status and gender: Women  
Probit model 
  Women Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Married -0.029** -0.059*** -0.067*** 0.010 0.016 0.043* 
 
[0.015] [0.017] [0.025] [0.013] [0.015] [0.022] 
Photo 1 0.029** 0.028** 0.023* 0.014 0.022* 0.029** 
 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.011] [0.012] [0.015] 
Photo 2 -0.001 0.037 0.049 -0.007 -0.012 -0.033 
 





































Firm fixed effects N N N N N N 
N 4,157 4,157 4,157 3,992 3,992 3,992 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust 
and clustered at the firm level. *** (**) [*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) [10%]. All regressions 
control for age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign 
language, and a leadership dummy. The coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of 





Table B4: Econometric results by groups: Women Probit model 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Public university -0.010 0.007 0.005 -0.011 
  
 
[0.012] [0.020] [0.022] [0.013] 







Photo 1 (European) 0.035*** 0.027 0.049 0.024 0.029 0.037** 
 
[0.013] [0.021] [0.033] [0.015] [0.025] [0.017] 
Photo 2 (Mestizo) 0.020 0.022 0.102** -0.001 0.001 0.032* 
 
[0.013] [0.019] [0.041] [0.013] [0.023] [0.019] 
No photo -0.018 0.011 0.012 -0.012 -0.022 -0.006 
 
[0.014] [0.021] [0.035] [0.015] [0.025] [0.018] 




N 3,029 1,128 1,074 3,083 1,622 2,535 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust 
and clustered at the firm level. *** (**) [*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) [10%]. All regressions 
control for age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign 
language, and a leadership dummy. The coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of 





Appendix C – Estimation results for Men 
Table C1: Econometric results: Men  
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Public university 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.014* 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007] 
Married 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.006 
 
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] 









Photo 2 (Mestizo) 
 
0.014 



















Photo 1 and 2 (European and 





  Photo 2 and 4 (mestizo and 
no photo)     
0.006 
 
    
[0.008] 
 Firm fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
N 3,992 3,992 3,992 3,992 3,992 3,992 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust 
and clustered at the firm level. ** (*) denotes statistical significance at 5% (10%). All regressions control 
for age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign 
language, and a leadership dummy. The coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of 
them are not statistically significant, with the exception of the business major). Columns (1) to (5) do not 
include firm fixed effects. The results are similar when using marginal effects in a logit or probit (see 






Table C2: Econometric results: Men  
Probit model 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Public university 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Married 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008 
 
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 









Photo 2 (Mestizo) 
 
0.014 
   
  
[0.010] 










 Photo 1 and 2 (European and 





 Photo 2 and 4 (mestizo and no 
photo)     
0.006 
    
[0.008] 
N 3,992 3,992 3,992 3,992 3,992 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets 
are robust and clustered at the firm level. ** (*) denotes statistical significance at 5% (10%). All 
regressions control for age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, 
dummies for foreign language, and a leadership dummy. The coefficients on the control 
variables are not presented (all of them are not statistically significant, with the exception of 











Table C3: Econometric results by group: Men 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Public university 0.010 -0.008 0.058*** -0.011 
  
 
[0.009] [0.017] [0.019] [0.010] 







Photo 1 (European) 0.021 0.018 -0.005 0.028** 0.002 0.024 
 
[0.013] [0.018] [0.027] [0.013] [0.020] [0.016] 
Photo 2 (Mestizo) 0.013 0.017 -0.014 0.025** 0.006 0.022 
 
[0.012] [0.018] [0.026] [0.012] [0.021] [0.015] 
No photo -0.005 -0.012 -0.048** 0.012 -0.002 -0.006 
 
[0.012] [0.018] [0.024] [0.013] [0.023] [0.015] 




N 2,781 1,211 1,151 2,841 1,440 2,552 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust 
and clustered at the firm level. *** (**) [*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) [10%]. All regressions 
control for age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign 
language, and a leadership dummy. The coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of 
them are not statistically significant, with the exception of the business major). Columns (1) to (5) do not 
include firm fixed effects. The results are similar when using marginal effects in a logit or probit (see 






Table C4: Econometric results by groups: Men Probit model 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Public university 0.009 -0.007 0.056*** -0.011 
  
 
[0.009] [0.016] [0.018] [0.010] 







Photo 1 (European) 0.023 0.018 -0.007 0.030** -0.001 0.026 
 
[0.014] [0.019] [0.025] [0.014] [0.020] [0.017] 
Photo 2 (Mestizo) 0.013 0.018 -0.015 0.028** 0.004 0.022 
 
[0.013] [0.019] [0.022] [0.014] [0.022] [0.016] 
No photo -0.003 -0.011 -0.046** 0.014 -0.002 -0.005 
 
[0.012] [0.018] [0.021] [0.015] [0.023] [0.016] 




N 2,781 1,211 1,151 2,841 1,440 2,552 
Notes: Estimation by the authors using a linear probability model. Standard errors in brackets are robust 
and clustered at the firm level. *** (**) [*] denotes statistical significance at 1% (5%) [10%]. All regressions 
control for age, business dummy, scholarship dummy, public high-school dummy, dummies for foreign 
language, and a leadership dummy. The coefficients on the control variables are not presented (all of 
them are not statistically significant, with the exception of the business major).  
 
